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Organic Law On the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates: A TOOL 
FOR POLITICAL STABILITY 
 
By Dr. Orovu Sepoe 
 
‘A tool is as good as the user who uses it’. If not used properly or misused, it may cause 
harm or not perform its role.’ 
 
I begin with this metaphor to stress that the Organic Law On the Integrity of Political 
Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) can only meet its objectives if and until key political 
actors (including registered political parties, members of parliament, the government in 
power and relevant agencies responsible for implementing the Organic Law) use it 
properly to achieve its overall objective of creating political stability. 
 
Four years on (2001-2004) from its enactment to its implementation, some commentators 
from the public and the academia and think tanks in the region, have questioned the 
effectiveness or workability of OLIPPAC. Some have boldly stated that OLIPPAC has 
failed. This declaration reminds me of a similar thesis namely ‘failed state’; a contested 
notion which argues that particular States in the Pacific have failed; an example being the 
Solomon Islands, whilst others such as PNG and Nauru are heading towards that 
direction. Counteracting this thesis are those who have argued that Pacific states have 
hardly had a century of experience in parliamentary and constitutional democracy and yet 
they have been declared failed states or about to become failed states. Others argue that 
given the harsh realities of their colonial experience and the haphazard process of 
decolonisation in the Pacific Island states, these factors, to some extent, explain the 
current poor state of affairs in these countries. This, of course, does not rule out in way 
the inexcusable problem of corruption in high places. We all agree that corrupt leadership 
resembles a tropical ulcer for these States. 
 
In this article I wish to provide some insights into the current status of OLIPPAC as a 
tool for creating political stability and to highlight the challenges of implementing the 
law. 
 
I wish to argue that OLIPPAC is a worthwhile tool for creating political stability in PNG 
and take issue with the argument that OLIPPAC has failed. Two issues underpin the 
views I express here. First, is OLIPPAC meaningless or insignificant in the context of a 
weak party system or endemic political instability in PNG? Second, who is responsible 
for making OLIPPAC achieve its overall goal of creating political stability? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 This paper is a response to Alphonse Gelu’s contribution to the Pacific Week on “ The Failure of the 
Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties & Candidates”, RSPAS, Australian National University, 
January 2005. 
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With these questions in mind let me reflect on the brief history and current status of 
implementing OLIPPAC. The implementation of OLIPPAC took effect in 2001 when the 
Central Fund Board (renamed the Integrity Commission following the 2003 amendment) 
and the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties was established, with relevant 
appointments made in accordance with Section 4 of the law.  Two thirds of the 
membership comprise of constitutional Office holders, namely the Clerk of Parliament, 
Electoral Commissioner, the Chairman of National Fiscal Commission and the Registrar. 
These ex-officio members, including the two community (church and women) 
representatives have to play a crucial role in ensuring the independence of the Integrity 
Commission by standing above party politics and any other political pressure. Otherwise, 
the vision of OLIPPAC would be seriously comprised and undermined. 
 
In terms of staffing, the Registrar has been the only full-time staff, assisted by three 
casual staff and one seconded legal advisor. These casual officers, along with the 
Registrar, constituted the Secretariat from 2001 to 2004 performing their responsibilities 
within the constraints of scant resources with total commitment. The Minister responsible 
for the Integrity Commission is the Prime Minster. Budgeted directly under the Prime 
Minister’s Department, one can see how political will, or its absence, can have a 
tremendous influence on how the Integrity Commission and the Registry of Political 
Parties can perform its role. 
 
In 2001 when the registration process began, altogether 44 political parties applied for 
registration in 2001 and the Central Fund Board of Management (now Integrity 
Commission) approved registration for all, except one.  What was foremost in the mind 
of the Commission at the time of registration was to accommodate the prevailing 
situation of large numbers of political parties and to later facilitate a natural process of 
amalgamation or even dissolution of smaller parties, in the event of electoral defeat or 
simply inability to endure the stringent requirements of OLIPPAC. This vision played 
itself out in the actual political events during the years 2002, 2003 and 2004.  
 
When the writs for the 2002 election were issued the 43 registered political parties 
endorsed candidates to contest the race. After the 2002 national election, only 21 
registered political parties had elected members in Parliament. In the aftermath of the 
2002 election, smaller parties with one or less than a handful of elected members decided 
to amalgamate with larger political parties. As it happens often in PNG after elections, 
Independent Members of Parliament, on the eve of formation of government, decided 
their opportunities would be maximised if they joined registered political parties, and 
most did. All these resulted in boosting party membership in Parliament. Overall this 
process, although sometimes quite problematic, was often prompted by the political 
ambitions and interests of the elected members with little or no consultation with the 
membership of the political parties or their constituency outside parliament.  
 
By 2004, the number of political parties in Parliament had been reduced to 15 and a 
major player in the enactment of the Organic Law, namely People’s Democratic Party, 
had changed its name to Papua New Guinea Party – in accordance with relevant 
provision of the law. This happened to rid the Party’s identification with the founder 
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(who was expelled), although his supporters in the party were resistant to the name and 
leadership change. 
 
Meanwhile, characteristic trends in PNG politics continued in spite of the existence of 
OLIPPAC. For instance, internal party politics seeped out to destroy parliamentary 
coalition solidarity and threatened to dismantle and effectively destabilise the government 
for a great deal of the period after the grace period of 18 months (2001 to mid-2002). A 
prolonged suspension of parliament after the grace period hardly helped the political 
standing of PNG in terms of principles of good governance. 
 
In 2003, when the Prime Minister attempted to push through the constitutional 
amendment to Section 145 on Vote of No Confidence, this added more trouble to a much 
fragile coalition government. Politicians continued to play their power juggling games in 
spite of provisions in OLIPPAC that required them to support the Prime Minister or 
abstain. Contrary to provisions of OLIPPAC, not all members of the coalition partners 
were willing to support the Prime Minister in the proposed Constitutional amendment to 
extend the grace period to 36 months. None followed the Standing Orders of Parliament 
to legitimise their choice to abstain. Ambivalence to rules of conduct is common amongst 
most Members of Parliament. Instability continued particularly as a result of leadership 
struggles within major political parties and this was in turn due to the failure of political 
parties to comply with provisions of OLIPPAC. For example, resolution of internal party 
conflicts was not the responsibility of the Registrar of Political Parties to resolve but an 
internal party matter to be resolved in accordance with the respective party constitution 
and party resolution. Too few of the parties concerned were willing to adhere to this 
simple requirement.  
 
Throughout 2004, in and outside Parliament, renegade coalition partners and their 
supporters relentlessly plotted to move a vote of no confidence against Sir Michael 
Somare. The chaos inside Parliament regarding the sitting arrangements of government 
and opposition MPs did little to support political stability envisaged in OLIPPAC. The 
non-partisan status of the Speaker of Parliament also came under serious question. 
Advice from the Clerk of Parliament to the Speaker, originating from the Integrity 
Commission decisions, conveyed through the Registrar of Political Parties, seemed to fall 
by the way side. Clearly, political ambitions and political expediency tended to over-ride 
OLIPPAC, which did little to instill any sense of discipline in the MPs’ behaviour and 
those of political parties generally. 
 
The national court and private lawyers were kept busy with the business of adjudicating 
disputes on party leadership and internal party divisions. The Ombudsman Commission 
also had its share of workload relating to cases of non-compliance by individual MPs, 
which constituted a breach of the Leadership Code. Specific examples include a few MPs 
who voted against the Prime Minister in matters that required their support as determined 
by OLIPPAC. 
 
By March 2004, by law all registered political parties were required to furnish their 
financial returns. The response was slow in coming. Nevertheless by August 2004, all 
State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Working Paper No.2005/4 5
registered political parties in Parliament had submitted their financial returns. The 
Registrar of Political Parties made sure that all financial returns were fully complete. 
Only six registered political parties not in Parliament submitted their financial returns. 
The rest (17 of them) failed to submit their financial statements. This constituted a 
serious breach of OLIPPAC. It was time to apply the ultimate penalty. The Integrity 
Commission made a decision in December 2004 that these political parties be 
deregistered. A public notice to this effect in the print media is forthcoming.  
 
From this brief account, one hopes to create greater awareness that it has been a difficult 
task attempting to regulate the political behaviour of key players, particularly political 
parties and Members of Parliament. Some aspects of our political culture that has become 
entrenched such as party hoping and lack of party discipline will not change overnight or 
in a period of two to three years. At the very least we have OLIPPAC to help us 
discipline MPs and political parties, and the ruling coalition government. The existence 
of OLIPPAC and its inherent potential provides some hope for some measure of political 
order for PNG’s extremely erratic political culture (party hoping, opportunism, threats of 
no confidence, etc). Let’s not forget that it is this very problematic context within which 
OLIPPAC has been adopted and implemented. It is also an established fact that party 
mechanisms are relatively frail and posses neither organisational capacity nor the 
political clout to mobilise grassroots or popular support. The challenges of strengthening 
political parties must surely be a daunting under such conditions, as testified by events of 
the first four years. 
 
Some measure of sensitivity is therefore needed in assessing the effectiveness of 
OLIPPAC. Funding constraints continue to impede the effectiveness of the Office of the 
Registrar of Political Party. The Office has been under-resourced from its inception to 
this very point in time. Now that the required staff, at least the key officers, will soon be 
appointed this may help to boost the capacity of the Secretariat to carry out its 
responsibility.  In addition, continued political commitment from the government in 
power will ensure the Registrar’s Office and the Integrity Commission fulfill their 
mandate. 
 
The effectiveness of OLIPPAC is dependent on the key actors. If registered political 
parties and Members of Parliament comply with provisions of OLIPPAC then we can 
expect some degree of political stability. In addition, if the independence and the capacity 
of the Registrar’s Office and the Integrity Commission are not undermined they can carry 
out their mandate effectively. Ultimately, OLIPPAC is as good as the users who abide by 
it and are serious about political stability and the common good. 
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